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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL DOUBT
Frederick Schauer*

THE CASE LAw SYSTEM IN AMERICA. By Karl N. Llewellyn. Edited
by Paul Gewirtz. Translated from the German by Michael Ansaldi.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1989. Pp. xxxvii, 127.
$24.95.
Like The Bramble Bush, 1 Karl Llewellyn's Pra]udizienrecht und
Rechtsprechung in Amerika2 was written not for the specialist but for
the neophyte. But where The Bramble Bush was designed for the beginning American law student, Pra]udizienrecht in Amerika was aimed
at the German lawyer seeking to understand from a civil law background something about the American common law system. 3 And
just as The Bramble Bush (and The Path of the Law thirty years earlier4) was far richer theoretically than one would normally expect
from an introduction for the novice, so too is Pra]udizienrecht in
Amerika a work of much more theoretical interest and novelty than
the standard discussion of the rudiments of American law aimed at
non-American audiences.
Pra]udizienrecht in Amerika is hardly an unknown work. Extensively reviewed when published, 5 and discussed in much of the secondary literature on Llewellyn in particular and Realism in general, 6 it is
properly considered one of Llewellyn's major works. Still, because it
was written and published only in German, it was until now largely
inaccessible to most of those who are interested either in Legal Realist
theory or in the development of Llewellyn's thought.
With the publication of Michael Ansaldi's careful and fluid translation of Pra]udizienrecht in Amerika, this gap in the corpus of Llewellyn in English has been filled. The book, published under the
• Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. -Ed.
1. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
2. K. LLEWELLYN, PRAJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG lN AMERIKA (1933).
3. The book was based on a series oflectures delivered by Llewellyn in Leipzig, in 1928-1929.
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
5. A list of reviews is set out at p. x n.3. Two of them, Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82
U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934), and Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Priijudizienrecht
in Amerika, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 199 (1933), have become important parts of the literature in
their own right.
6. See w. TwlNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). Parts of
the book had been translated into English by Dawson and included within J. DAWSON, COMPARATIVE LAW 187-200 (1951).
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translated title, The Case Law System in America, and edited by Paul
Gewirtz, should eliminate any excuse for students of Realism to ignore
this important work, and should as well provide a useful synopsis of
much of Llewellyn's thinking for those whose exposure might previously have consisted only of The Bramble Bush and isolated excerpts
from The Common Law Tradition. 7
The Case Law System in America, as befits its provenance as a series of lectures to a German audience, contains much that genuinely is
only an introduction for the novice. Consequently, most American
readers can skim with little fear of loss the various parts of this short
book that deal with the structure of American courts (pp. 27-34), the
nature of the citation system (pp. 16-22), and the technicalities of civil
procedure (pp. 34-42). Much more of the book, however, is far removed from simple factual exposition, and sets forth insightfully, creatively, and controversially many distinctly Llewellynesque ideas
about how the American system of common law decisionmaking actually operates.
Perhaps the most important of these ideas, important precisely because it has been so little heeded, is Llewellyn's recurrent call for sociological inquiry into the nature of legal decisionmaking (pp. 9-12, 89113). A sociological approach to legal decisionmaking stands in opposition to the now common normative mode of legal scholarship, in
which prescribing desirable results to judges is the norm and everything else the exception. By contrast, throughout this book, as in
much of the rest of his work, Llewellyn urges those who wish to understand the legal system to assess externally and empirically the actual nature of judicial decisionmaking, and to do so systematically
rather than anecdotally. As this book makes clear, it is undoubtedly
Llewellyn's view that such inquiry would show the extent to which
there are indeed patterns of dealing with precedent as well as predictable patterns of judicial decisionmaking. These patterns, however, diverge more often than not from those that might be perceived simply
from a literal reading of judicial opinions.
As Professor Gewirtz's introduction makes plain (pp. xvii-xxii),
there is another dominant theme of this book: the continuing interplay between, on the one hand, a greater degree of judicial freedom in
the use of precedents than classical legal theory would acknowledge
and, on the other, the way in which a wide range of acculturating
forces is likely to lead to that freedom being exercised by judges in
largely parallel ways. The interplay of judicial freedom and acculturating forces results in more constraint than an exclusive focus on judi7. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON CIDING APPEALS (1960). And surely the most commonly read part of the latter work

DE·
is the
article originally published as Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
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cial freedom or leeway would acknowledge, and consequently more
ability to predict judicial decisions than one who had assimilated only
the crudest and most caricatured forms of Realism would expect.
Llewellyn's focus, then, is on the recurring patterns of lawyerly behavior, and on the degree of constraint and predictability that such recurring patterns facilitate. This concern shows the extent to which
Llewellyn was among the most moderate of the Realists.
There can be little doubt that shared experiences bring shared perspectives. Because appellate judges are universally drawn from the
ranks of practicing lawyers, and because practicing lawyers are almost
universally characterized by having spent three years in American law
schools more similar to each other than they are different, it should
come as little surprise that the universe of appellate judg_es does not
replicate in all respects the characteristics of the universe of human
beings. Partly because of the internalization of professional norms of
lawyering and judging, partly because such norms serve to create and
reinforce a somewhat autonomou~ professional culture, 8 and partly because of the self-selection that leads some people to become lawyers
and others not (to say nothing of the social forces that lead some people to have the opportunity of becoming lawyers and others not), and
some lawyers to become judges and others not (to say nothing of the
social forces that lead some lawyers to have the opportunity of becoming judges and others not9), the range of likely appellate judicial reac- ·
tions to a given problem is narrower than that of the population at
large. Moreover, this narrowness is exacerbated by the way in which
the methods, institutions, and structures of appellate decisionmaking
themselves exercise a constraining force beyond that exercised by the
similarity of perspective among the individuals inhabiting those
institutions.
Still, there is another story to be told, and it is one that Llewellyn
consistently avoids. Just as lawyers share much in common, so too do
they differ in psychological makeup, political perspective, personal
background, and self-understanding of their role. Although Llewellyn
pays lip service to these and other sources of difference, he continuously focuses on the ways in which appellate judges see things similarly rather than differently. 10
8. See generally N. LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (E. King & M. Albrow
trans. 1985).
9. The parallel structure of the parentheticals should not be taken to be making a parallel
statistical claim. To the contrary, it is quite possible that the opportunity to become a judge
given that one is a lawyer is far greater than the opportunity to become a lawyer given that one is
a resident of the United States.
10. Jerome Frank, Llewellyn's contemporary, and many modem scholars do not ignore the
existence of differences among judges or the effect of those differences. J. FRANK, LAw AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930); see also M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 45-51,
103-07 (1987); Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate
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The extent to which differences in background, social situation,
psychological makeup, and political outlook make a difference in the
outcome of judicial decisionmaking is likely to be a function of the size
of the space within which judicial discretion operates. Here again
Llewellyn's jurisprudential conservatism (which bears no necessary relation to political conservatism) comes through, a conservatism even
more apparent now than perhaps it was then. Foreshadowing the contemporary work of Priest and Klein and others, 11 Llewellyn notes in
this book that "we may pretty safely say, almost every case on appeal
to a court oflast resort could be decided just as easily, legally speaking, for the plaintiff as for the defendant" (p. 8). This to Llewellyn is
decidedly not a statement about the essentially indeterminate nature of
legal reasoning. Rather, it is a statement about the incentives that lead
some issues to be disputed and others not, some disputes to be tried
and others not, and some trial court decisions to be appealed and
others not.
It is hard to get around this dilemma. If the proper outcome of the case
were not really a matter of doubt, how is it that an honest, competent
judge in the court of first instance could decide it "incorrectly"? Again,
if the outcome of the case were not really in doubt, how is it that an
honest, competent attorney could burden his client with the time and
expense of an appeal if the trial court has rendered a "correct" judgment? The very fact that there is an appeal usually proves that doubts
exist among professionals, unless the attorney is using the appeal merely
as a dilatory tactic. [p. 8]

At this point in the argument Llewellyn appears agnostic about
what it is that makes a case such that it could be decided, "just as
easily, legally speaking, for the plaintiff as for the defendant" (p. 8).
Throughout the book, however, he appears less agnostic, often expressing views sympathetic to the position that rules with an "invariant
wording" (p. 73) would with little doubt "encompass many cases" (p.
73). "Insofar as these cases were known to the lawmaker before the
rule was laid down, and insofar as circumstances have remained un. changed since that time, one can work with the rule deductively" (p.
73). Only when "the possibility of doubt arises" (p. 73) does the situation become different.
Similarly, Llewellyn claims that there are cases
[such] that.no one has any doubt about how to handle [them], but that
no one had in mind when the rule was created. Nonetheless anyone who
looked at the case and the rule at the same time would "recognize" that
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984); Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique oflnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 781 (1983).
11. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); see
also Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Priest, Selectfre
Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the
Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988).
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the case must be governed by the rule. Here I maintain that no real
"interpretation" of the rule is taking place. [p. 74]
None of this is crystal clear in the book, and interpretations other

than my own are plausible. Still, much of this strikes me as making
the essentially positivist (in Dworkin's sense12) claim that there is a
body of doctrine called "the rules of law," that those rules have centers and peripheries that largely track the centers and peripheries of
the meaning of their component linguistic parts, and that cases lying
within the centers are such that competent lawyers recognize them as
such; the consequence being that such cases are rarely disputed and
even more rarely appealed to courts of last resort. As a result, the
cases that are so disputed and appealed are the skewed sample of cases
lying on the peripheries of the legal rules, such peripheries being themselves determined by recourse to linguistic meaning and little else.
The remarkable modesty of this claim becomes apparent upon consideration of an alternative explanation for the selection hypothesis.
Suppose the legal system were such that the rules of law were taken
merely as transparent probabilistic guides (rules of thumb) to morally
correct results. In such a system it would be legitimate for a legal
decisionmaker, such as a judge, to disregard a legal rule even within
the center of its linguistic extension when application of that rule to
some case would produce a morally incorrect result. Were that the
case, even competent lawyers would have reason to create a dispute,
bring a case to trial, or appeal an unfavorable result whenever they felt
they could maintain a plausible argument for moral correctness, even
if the plain linguistic meaning of a plainly applicable legal rule inclined
in exactly the opposite direction. This is not, however, to deny the
operation of the selection hypothesis. Even were moral correctness a
winning legal argument it would still be true that only those cases in
which two competent lawyers felt somewhat confident in advancing
opposing positions would be disputed, tried, or appealed. But the array of cases so selected, although still unrepresentative of all legal
12. I append the parenthetical to note that I am referring here to positivism in the sense of a
limited and pedigreeable set of materials extensionally divergent from a society's totality of accepted social norms. This is the sense of positivism that Dworkin attacks in R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (1977), and R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), and that
others defend. See R. GAVISON, Comment, in ISSUES IN CoNTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 21 (R. Gavison ed. 1987); J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
37-121 (1979). For quite contrasting approaches to what positivism is all about, approaches
rejecting the centrality of the "limited domain" idea, see J. COLEMAN, Negative and Positive
Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3 (1988); Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and
Legal Theory (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation
of the Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 MICH. L. REv. 473 (1977). The debate continues.
Compare Postema, Positivism, I Presume? . • • Comments on Schauer's "Rules and the Rule of
Law," 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991) and Schauer, Rules and the Rule of
Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991) with Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991).
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events, would be different, now representing an array of cases of moral
doubt rather than of linguistic doubt.
Most readers will recognize this picture as similar to Dworkin's
picture of the legal system. And if we substitute "social" for "moral"
we come closer to Eisenberg's account of the nature of the common
law. 13 Other variants could be added as well. But the point I wish to
make here is that even if Llewellyn is right about the concentration of
hard cases in appellate courts, and about the consequent fallacy of
generalizing from those "borderline" cases to the operation and effect
oflaw in society at large (p. 1), little about the nature oflegal decisionmaking follows from this premise. Llewellyn appears to think that the
chief distinction between hard cases and easy ones derives from their
linguistic/doctrinal extension, hardly a radical and hardly a Realist
conclusion, and one diverging substantially from the picture that one
would get from reading Frank or others similarly inclined.
That Llewellyn is a "conservative" on this aspect of legal theory
does not necessarily make him wrong. Indeed, if (as he himself suggests) we take his view of doctrinal dominance as presumptive rather
than conclusive, his conclusions strike me as largely correct. 14 Yet in
terms of many enduring debates about the nature of legal decisionmaking, it is nonetheless true that Llewellyn's comparatively narrow
view of the determinants of legal doubt hardly puts him in the forefront of extreme challenges to traditional understandings of how the
law operates.
Llewellyn's doubts are limited in a quite different sense as well.
Although he occasionally acknowledges the cultural contingency of
the various stabilizing factors that his work is noted for identifying (p.
10), Llewellyn just as often transmits the message of inevitability, such
as when he claims that the gravitation toward moderately strong precedential constraint is the natural course of all lawyers and all legal
systems (pp. 48-49). Surely to describe as both inevitable and inevitably desirable the control by the past that is necessarily part of any
system that takes precedent seriously requires far more showing than
we get here or anywhere else in Llewellyn's work. Llewellyn's position presupposes views about either the desirability of an existing state
of affairs or the desirability of stability for stability's sake that can
hardly be called necessary or universal. 15 This is not to deny that
some states of affairs may be worth entrenching, nor that stability for
stability's sake might sometimes be desirable. When such goals are
sought, a system of precedent is often a valuable instrument. But at
certain times and in certain places there can be reasonable doubts
13. M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
14. See Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509, 544-48 (1988).
15. See Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); Schauer, Prece·
dent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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about whether to entrench a state of affairs and about the value of
stability for stability's sake, 16 doubts that Llewellyn rarely seems to
express.
In similar fashion, Llewellyn rarely expresses doubts about the
choices that are built into the constraining factors he properly identifies. His faith in judges (if only they become self-aware), in the bar,
and in the legal institutions providing the constraints is largely unclouded by doubts about the choices built into these constraints. He is
rarely critical, for example, of the process of selecting lawyers whose
uniform training and acculturation provides one of his stabilizing factors, nor of an adversary system of decisionmaking whose special style
dampens potential diversity of decisions. Nor is Llewellyn's faith
tested by the consideration of alternative arrangements that might
provide equally constraining but substantively different constraint.
Just as he appears relatively confident that doctrinal and linguistic uncertainty is the major source of legal uncertainty, so too does heappear equally confident that the sources of legal certainty are as fixed a
part of the social landscape as are the rules of language. What
emerges from this book, therefore, is an impression, at least partly attributable to what happens to most of us when we are called upon to
explain our own system in other countries, 17 of a Llewellyn both far
more committed to the existence of legal determinacy and far more
uncritically appreciative of its sources than the standard picture either
of Llewellyn or of Realism in general would have led many to expect.
Realism is as much a part of the American legal landscape as it is
widely misunderstood, and much the same can be said of Llewellyn.
In light of that, this sensitively translated and edited work, now accessible partly because of its brevity but mostly because of the skill of
those who have brought it to us, should be required reading for those
who seek to understand the development of American legal thought
and the operation of the common law in appellate courts. None of my
skepticism about Llewellyn's message applies at all to the enterprise of
making it available.

16. See Horwitz, The Rule ofLaw: An Unqualified Human Good? (Book Review), 86 YALE
L.J. 561 (1977).
17. However much we may criticize or be skeptical of our own systems when we are home,
explaining those systems abroad often brings out defenses and justifications that would otherwise
seem embarrassing.

